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I. Introduction
A. Scope
This memorandum examines the recent Special Court of Sierra Leone’s (SCSL) June 20,
2007 decision in the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, which dismissed the allegation of
Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE)1 against defendants.2 The Court, as well as international war
crimes experts such as William Schabas,3 claimed that the Prosecution alleged a JCE for a crime
not listed in the Statute and dismissed the JCE charge.
This memorandum provides ammunition to refute the argument that it is necessary that a
JCE itself be criminal and applies a means-based test instead. If one person committed crimes in
order to further a common purpose, even if that purpose is not criminal, a JCE exists.
Furthermore, jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) holds that general or vague pleadings of JCE are acceptable, as long as the nature of the
crimes infers a JCE and the Defendant can properly respond to the charge alleged.

* “What are some compelling arguments against the position of William Schabas and the AFRC decision
maintaining that JCE liability applies only to groups that have a criminal purpose, not to groups of people
that use criminal means to arrive at a non-criminal purpose? Furthermore, what are the notice and
liability requirements for alleging a JCE?”
1

Joint Criminal Enterprise is also referred to as “common purpose” or “common design.” All three are
used interchangeably in this memorandum. See Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal
Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 606, 607 (2004)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].
2

Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment (June 20, 2007)
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Brima et al. or Brima] [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 7].

3

William Schabas is the Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University of
Ireland, Galway, where he is also the chair in human rights law. His biography is available at
http://www.nuigalway.ie/human_rights/Staff/william_schabas.html [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 66].

1

ICTY jurisprudence serves as the proper guide to define the scope of common purpose
liability. JCE decisions from the ICTY greatly influence the broader development of
international criminal law and serve as the best precedent for future tribunals to follow.4 The
ICTY is the first international criminal tribunal since the Trials at Nuremberg, which took place
over fifty years ago.5 In fact, the Tadić Judgment, although drawn from Nuremberg
jurisprudence and customary international law, is hailed as the defining case for JCE; its
principals still followed by the ICTY and other tribunals today.6
The first section of this memorandum discusses the origins of the JCE doctrine defined in
the Prosecutor v. Tadić. The next section discusses the evolution of the JCE doctrine. Section
IV analyzes the Brima Judgment and how the SCSL erred in its decision. Finally, the last
section is a public policy argument on the importance of JCE and argues that the SCSL made a
mistake in dismissing the JCE charge.

4

Katrina Gustafson, The Requirement of an “Express Agreement” for Joint Enterprise Liability, 5 J.
INT’L. CRIM. J. 134, 158 (2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
5

Michael P. Scharf, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 3 (1997) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 63].

6

See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment (Nov. 30, 2005) [relevant
pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15]; Prosecutor v. Blagojević , Jokic, Case No. IT02-60-T, Trial Judgment (Jan. 17, 2005) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
Both of these cases repeat the analysis of the Tadić decision and agree that Article 7(1) of the ICTY
Statute contains the basis to charge individuals with individual criminal liability. These individuals share
a common purpose to embark on criminal activity carried out jointly or by some members in this group of
persons. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, ¶510 (Nov. 30,
2005) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15]; Prosecutor v. Blagojević , Jokic,
Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, ¶695 (Jan. 17, 2005) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 5]; see generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192, available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoce/basic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf [hereinafter ICTY Statute] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 30]; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment (July 15, 1999) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

2

B. Summary of Conclusions
1. If the Means are Criminal, there is a JCE.
ICTY jurisprudence holds that a JCE itself does not have to be criminal. A common
purpose may be legitimate, but when crimes are committed in order to achieve a common
purpose, there is a JCE. The actual motive behind the common purpose is irrelevant. Similarly,
in cases of conspiracy, a form of criminal liability similar to JCE, when defendants pursued
criminal means in order to achieve a common purpose, courts consistently found a conspiracy.
Therefore, the Indictment in the Prosecutor v. Brima, which alleged that defendants committed
crimes to further a common purpose or were foreseeable results of the common purpose,
properly alleged a JCE.
2. The Specificity Required by the Brima Judgment is in Conflict with the
ICTY’s Jurisprudence Regarding Proper Notice of JCE.
ICTY jurisprudence not only set a precedent for allowing general allegations of JCE, but
also found a JCE despite the indictment neglecting to specifically allege one. From the nature of
the crimes alleged, courts may infer a JCE. In particular, the ICTY courts found JCEs existed in
cases where defendants committed war crimes, even though the indictments did not explicitly
allege a JCE. In addition, ICTY jurisprudence shows that it is possible to find defendants guilty
of crimes pursuant to furthering a JCE, even though the indictment alleges crimes not provided
for in the Statute.
3. The SCSL Trial Chamber Erred in Ruling that JCE Cannot Change Over
Time.
The SCSL Trial Chamber held that if the common plan to control Sierra Leone’s
diamond mines involved crimes, this plan commenced at the inception of the agreement among
the group. If the JCE changed, the Court argued, the Prosecution must plead the new purposes in

3

the Indictment, which they did not. This argument is incorrect for several reasons. First, a JCE
need not be criminal from inception. Second, the rule requiring new facts and evidence of the
“new” JCE is not found anywhere in ICTY jurisprudence. Finally, the Trial Chamber’s
argument defies its own logic. The Trial Chamber held that the prosecution pled JCE incorrectly
by alleging a crime not listed in the SCSL Statute. Then the Trial Chamber said that there was a
JCE in the beginning but that the Prosecution failed to provide facts for the new JCE. Therefore
the Trial Chamber simultaneously held the existence and nonexistence of a JCE from the
beginning of the agreement.
4. The SCSL’s Decision in the Brima Judgment is Against Public Policy.
JCE has its critics and there is a backlash against the broad application of JCE in
indictments. The Brima Judgment was an attempt by the SCSL to reign in the extensive use of
JCE. This was especially easy because the evidence was clear that defendants’ physically
perpetrated the acts. However, from a public policy standpoint this was a poor decision because
its logic flies in the face of ICTY jurisprudence and the definition of JCE as applied after the
Tadić decision.

4

II.

The Beginnings of Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: the Tadić Decision.
Dusko Tadić was a Bosnian Serb café owner who became a nationalist political leader, 7

but remained a low-level participant in Serbian politics.8 The ICTY Prosecutor indicted him on
34 counts of crimes within the ICTY’s Statute and jurisdiction.9 The Trial Chamber convicted
Tadić on several counts of war crimes, but acquitted him of murder as a crime against humanity.
In particular was the murder of five Muslim men in Jaskici, a Bosnian village.10 The Trial
Chamber held that it could not “on the evidence before it, be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused had any part in the killing of the five men.”11 Both sides appealed.
A. The Factual Background of the Prosecutor v. Tadić.
The Appeals Chamber in Tadić faced an important issue: could international criminal law
find Tadić criminally liable for the murder of five men even though there was no evidence that
he personally pulled the trigger and killed any of them? Ignoring the joint plan to commit these
crimes would ignore the collective and conspiratorial nature of these atrocities.12 The Appeals
Chamber looked to the Statute that provides the Court’s jurisdiction and found that “serious

7

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶181, 188 (May 7, 1997) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

8

Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise,
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 76, 104
(2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
9

Summary of Appeals Chamber Judgment, the Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić,
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/tad-sumj990715e.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2007) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 72].

10

Danner and Martinez, supra note 8, at 104-05 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].

11

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶373 (May 7, 1997) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

12

Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J.
INT’L. CRIM. J. 69 (2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46].

5

violations of international law is not limited merely to those who actually carry out the actus reus
of the enumerated crimes but appears to extend also to other offenders.”13 The Appeals Chamber
deduced the JCE doctrine from Article 7(1)14 which refers to the nature and collective aspect of
crimes and war crimes.15 The Appeals Chamber believed that failing to hold co-perpetrators
responsible for war crimes and atrocities disregards co-perpetrators’ roles in committing or
furthering to commit heinous acts. It was evident that but for these people, perpetration of these
crimes would not exist nor be possible.16 Despite the Indictment against Tadić lacking any
allegation that he was part of a JCE, the Appeals Chamber found that the ICTY Statute, as well
as the nature of the crimes alleged in the Indictment, inferred his participation in a common plan.
The Appeals Chamber also held that customary international law, and in particular
jurisprudence from the Nuremberg Trials, provided the theory behind mens rea and actus reus in
determining a JCE.17 The Appeals Chamber held that “the notion of common design as a form

13

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶189 (July 15, 1999) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

14

ICTY Statute, supra note 6, ¶7(1) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30]. This provision
deals with individual criminal responsibility. In particular, it holds that “a person who planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of
a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.”
Id. Articles 2 through 5 include grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention, violations of the laws or
customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
15

Ohlin, supra note 12.

16

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶192 (July 15, 1999) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

17

Id. at ¶189-220 (July 15, 1999); see generally Elies van Sliedregt, Criminal Responsibility in
International Law Liability Shaped by Policy Goals and Moral Outrage, 14 EUR. JOUR. CRIME 81-114
(2006) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 54].

6

of accomplice liability is firmly established in customary international law and. . . is upheld,
albeit implicitly, in the Statute of the International Tribunal.”18
The Appeals Chamber divided JCE liability into three types.
B. The First Category of JCE, the Basic Form.
The first category involves cases where there is an agreement among two or more people
to commit a crime. It is not required, however, that this be an expressed agreement. Instead, the
circumstances may infer the agreement.19 All the codefendants “acted pursuant to a common
design, possess the same criminal intention; for instance, the formulation of a plan among the coperpetrators to kill, where, in effecting this common design . . . they nevertheless all possess the
intent to kill.”20 The accused must voluntarily participate in the act or acts and intend the
result.21 This method of liability also applies in co-perpetration cases, in which all the
participants have the same intent to commit a crime, and one or more of the participants commits
the crime.22
C. The Second Category of JCE, the Systemic Form.
The second category of JCE is the “so-called ‘concentration camp’ cases.”23 This
category consists of cases where members of the military, such as those persons who ran
concentration camps, carried out the offenses. In most cases, the accused acted in pursuance of a
18

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶220 (July 15, 1999) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

19

Id. at ¶227.

20

Id. at ¶196.

21

Id. at ¶196.

22

Id. at ¶192-206.

23

Id. at ¶202.

7

common plan or design to kill or hurt prisoners and intended to commit war crimes. The accused
was always in a position of authority at the concentration camp. In both the first and second
categories of JCE, all members of the JCE are potentially criminally responsible for all crimes
that fell within that common design.24
D. The Third Category of JCE, the Extended Form.
The final category is arguably the most controversial25 and involves cases with a common
design or purpose where one of the accused commits an act, and while outside the common
purpose or design, was still “a natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that
common purpose.”26 For example, there is a common purpose to forcibly remove members
belonging to an ethnic group from a town. It is a likely consequence that in removing these
people against their will the murder of one or more persons will occur. Those who took part in
effectuating the common purpose are therefore guilty of murder under the 3rd type of liability of
JCE since it was foreseeable that this common purpose would ultimately result in criminal
deaths.27
E. The Actus Reus and Mens Rea Required to be Liable Under a JCE Theory of
Liability.
The Appeals Chamber further held that there are three requirements in order to have the
actus reus to commit a JCE. First, there must be a plurality of persons involved. It is not
necessary to have the organization in a specific structure, such as a militarily group. Second,

24

Danner and Martinez, supra note 8, at 106 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].

25

Id. at 109 (2005).

26

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶204 (July 15, 1999) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].

27

Id. at ¶204.
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there must exist “a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves the
commission of a crime provided for in the Statute.”28 It is not necessary that this plan be
previously arranged or formulated and may materialize extemporaneously. The fact that a group
of persons acted in unison to effectuate a joint criminal enterprise also gives rise to the inference
of a common plan.29 Finally, the Statute must list the crime committed as a punishable crime.
“This participation need not involve commission of a specific crime under one of those
provisions…but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the
common plan or purpose.”30
As mentioned above, there is no requirement of any prior planning for a JCE and the
crimes may arise extemporaneously. When there is an understanding that resembles an
agreement between two or more people that they will commit a crime, there is a JCE. “The
understanding or arrangement need not be express, and its existence may be inferred from all the
circumstances.” The understanding could also be unspoken or could be an actual agreement. In
either situation the accused must have had the intent to commit the crime.31
The mens rea required for JCE liability, however, differs according to the category of the
JCE. 32 Under the first category, the only requirement is intent to commit the act or acts. The
prosecution must demonstrate that all those charged, as well as the principal offender, had the
28

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶226 (July 15, 1999) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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Id. at ¶226.

30

Id. at ¶226.
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Id. at ¶227(ii); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Appeals Judgment, ¶119 (July 20,
2000) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
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Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶38 (July 18, 2005) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4]; Prosecutor v. Simic, Tadić, Zaric, Case No. IT-95-9-T,
Trial Judgment, ¶158 (Oct. 17, 2003) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
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same common state of mind required for the crime and performed an act or acts to further the
common purpose. 33 The second category requires personal knowledge of the system as well as
the intent to further the common goal. Finally, the third category requires an intention to
participate in and further the criminal purpose. If it was foreseeable that a crime might take
place by one of the other members of the group and the accused willingly took that risk, the
accused may be held responsible for a crime other than the one agreed upon.34 When the
Prosecution relies on an inference, it must, of course, be reasonable and substantiated by
evidentiary support.
F. Analysis of the Tadić Decision.
Some aspects regarding the manner in which the Appeals Chamber found JCE liability in
Tadić are particularly noteworthy. First, the ICTY statute never formally outlines JCE liability.
The prosecutor in Tadić also never explicitly relied on a concept of a common design, common
purpose, or a common plan.35 Instead, the Appeals Chamber, on its own, found a JCE inferred
from the charges alleged as well as Article 7(1), and claimed that JCE was “grounded in postwar jurisprudence, which has become part of customary international law.36 Yet, the Appeals
Chamber never explicitly mentioned Nuremberg in its review of the precedents for common plan
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Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment
and Prosecution Application to Amend, ¶26 (June 26, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 69].

34

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶228 (July 15, 1999) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
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Danner and Martinez, supra note 8, at 111 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
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ICTY Statute, supra note 6 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30]; Prosecutor v. Tadić,
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶189-90 (July 15, 1999) [relevant pages reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 21]; GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
121 (2005) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 65].
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liability.37 The Appeals Chamber also found that through the nature of crimes alleged, many of
which required joint participation, customary international law provided a basis for the existence
of JCE liability.38 The Nuremberg Tribunal’s jurisprudence found that the Nazis were guilty of a
common plan and conspiracy to commit war crimes. Reviewing cases from the Nuremberg
Tribunal, such as the Almelo Case and the Essen Lynching Trial, the Tadić Court found that there
was a customary basis for liability for co-perpetration in cases where the parties engaged in a
common design to commit a crime. From there the Appeals Chamber found the three forms of
JCE, even though neither Nuremberg case explicitly relied on the concept of a common design,
purpose or plan.39 Nevertheless, the notion of JCE as a form of individual criminal liability is
now a major weapon in the international criminal prosecutor’s arsenal.40
III. The Evolution of the JCE Doctrine.
Since the Tadić decision, the courts expanded the prerequisites needed for JCE guilt,
while keeping intact the basic fundamentals of JCE liability required in Tadić. Generally, the
participant of a JCE must perform the acts directed at furthering the common plan or purpose.
The ICTY held that “co-perpetratorship in a joint criminal enterprise . . . only requires that the
accused shares the mens rea or the ‘intent to pursue a common purpose’ and performs some acts
37

Danner and Martinez, supra note 8, at 117 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44].
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that ‘in some way are directed to the furtherance of the common design.’”41 The ICTY also held
that, given the absence of direct evidence, the circumstances give rise to an inference of intent.42
A. Indictment Specificity in Charging JCE.
In Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, decided four years after Tadić, the Appeals Chamber
addressed the issue of specificity in an indictment alleging a JCE. The Appeals Chamber
remarked that the issue was of general importance, even though the Prosecution did not request
the Court to review this issue.43 The Appeals Chamber said that allegations of a JCE in an
indictment require a strict definition of common purpose, identifying as precisely as possible the
principal perpetrators of the crimes. In other words, the accused must know whether the
indictment charges him with having contributed to a system involving all the acts under
prosecution or only some of them.44 It also required that the prosecution state a theory it
considered most likely to establish the accused’s responsibility in the JCE.45 The Appeals
Chamber effectively restricted how far JCE liability could stretch with regard to describing the
membership and activities of the enterprise.46 The Appeals Chamber also held that the

41

Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶38 (July 18, 2005) [relevant pages
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Trial Judgment, ¶263 (Sept.1, 2004) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6];
Prosecutor v. Simic, Tadić, Zaric, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial Judgment, ¶158 (Oct. 17, 2003) [relevant
pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]; Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T,
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prosecution must state the theory or theories it considered most likely to establish the accused’s
responsibility within accepted time-limits.47 Therefore the JCE must be clear in what it alleges.
The specificity required in Krnojelac, however, is limited only to acts which sought to further the
common purpose, not to extraneous criminal acts.48 For the crimes that do not fit into the
common purpose of the alleged system, the Court held that the prosecution should state the basis
it considered as the responsibility of the accused.49 Never does the Court hold, however, that the
Prosecution was too vague in its allegation of JCE, but rather, the common purpose alleged was
too broad.
B. The Rome Statute and Criticism of JCE.
The Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court now incorporates JCE into in
Article 25(d)(3).50 Article 25 makes the distinction between aiding and abetting and holds a
person liable for a JCE when he or she “contributes to the commissions of such a crime by a
group of persons acting with a common purpose.”51 It is also interesting to note that Article
25(d)(3) does not seem to recognize that JCE has any outer limits.52 JCE liability is a judgemade rule based on customary international law, and helps to determine liability of those who
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did not physically commit the crime.53
JCE receives its fair share of criticism, however. Many say that this is “judicial
creativity” and stretches past the bounds of criminal liability.54 In fact, William Schabas argued
that JCE liability is overused and stands for “Just Convict Everyone.”55 He argues against the
objective nature of JCE and the presumption of a reasonable person. He claims that JCE liability
establishes an objective rather than a subjective standard for the assessment of mens rea. “The
Tribunal can remain uncertain about what the offender actually believed, intended and knew, as
long as it is satisfied with how a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have judged
the situation and reacted.”56 He finds the third form of JCE particularly troublesome because it

53

The Babic Appeals Judgment held for JCE liability to attach it is not necessary that the accused be
physically present to commit the crime. “Participation in a joint criminal enterprise does not require that
the accused commit the actus reus of a specific crime provided for in the Statute,” Prosecutor v. Babic,
Case No. IT-03-72-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶38 (July 18, 2005) [relevant pages reproduced in
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with a view to carrying out the common plan or purpose. [He] need not physically and personally commit
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appears to hinge on a negligence standard of guilt, which “is a form of anti-social behaviour [sic]
judged by a different yardstick than those who commit crimes with malice and premeditation.”57
Convictions based on the third form of JCE liability, Schabas argues, diminish the Tribunals’
significance and compromise their historical legacy.58 Although defendants have a sense of
“willingness” that allows the consequences to occur, the mental element remains objective
because if the crime is foreseeable, then the mens rea of the accused is irrelevant. 59
For example, the ICTY Prosecution could not find actual evidence of Slobodan
Milosevic’s guilt of intending to committing war crimes. Instead, they alleged his guilt under a
JCE because it was reasonably foreseeable that his subordinates might commit atrocities in order
to carry out his common purpose. Schabas claims that this type of liability is similar to the case
of gangster Al Capone, where he was guilty of tax evasion and sent to Alcatraz, because U.S.
federal prosecutors could not find enough proof of murder. Schabas implicitly questions whether
this type of liability provides the justice defendants deserve. 60
Those critics who agree with Schabas also claim that JCE finds defendants guilty by
association, resembling a type of “organizational liability.”61 An individual is guilty for others’
actions because he associated with them. Therefore, there is no causal link between a
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defendant’s action or intention and the crime committed.62
A year before the decision in Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Schabas argued in
his book that in order to allege a JCE, the prosecutor must, with care, plead that the common
purpose was criminal.63 Schabas said that a common criminal purpose must involve perpetration
of a crime enumerated within the Statute. He ominously predicted that the prosecution’s
Indictment alleging a JCE in Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu was not within the Court’s
jurisdiction because the common purpose was not a crime found in the SCSL Statute.64
C. JCE Rejected in the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu.
The SCSL Statute, drafted in 2000, came one year after Tadić with the concept of JCE in
mind and also with an understanding that prosecutors prefer the expansive form of JCE.65
Although noteworthy that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the SCSL
both contain no express provision of JCE in their Statutes,66 a special provision is unnecessary,
as the ICTY found JCE inferred in its Statute. Similarly, the ICTR and SCSL may infer JCE
from their statutes as well.67 Article 6 of the SCSL Statute states that “a person who planned,
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39].

63

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 311 (2006) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 62].

64

Schabas, supra note 63 at 312 [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 62].

65

Danner and Martinez, supra note 8, at 104-05, 142-43 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
44].

66

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1598, available at
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2004.pdf [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 31]; Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Oct. 4, 2000, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc
S/2000/915 available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html [hereinafter SCSL Statute] [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
67

CRYER, supra note 38, at 305 [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 55].

16

instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or
execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually
responsible for the crime.”68 Similar to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, Article 6 of the SCSL
Statute gives rise to the inference of JCE. Although the ICTR does not often allege JCE, this
may be because their Statute, unlike the SCSL Statute, encompasses conspiracy to commit
genocide, which is a larger crime than JCE and is frequently alleged by the prosecution,
removing a need for using JCE as a recourse.69
In June of 2007, the SCSL tried defendants Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara
and Santigie Borbor Kanu of various crimes. The Trial Chamber II found the three guilty of
counts 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, and 13 of the Indictment in the Bombali region of Sierra Leone.70 These
crimes included exterminating persons through shooting, hacking and burning to death,
committing sexual violence, enlisting child soldiers, forcing labor and committing other
inhumane acts.71 The Trial Chamber found the three involved themselves in these alleged acts as
members in a military capacity, either with the Revolutionary United Front, the Civil Defense
Forces or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.72
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The prosecution argued in their Indictment that Brima, Kamara and Kanu “shared a
common plan, purpose or design (joint criminal enterprise) which was to take any actions
necessary to gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone, in
particular the diamond mining areas.”73 In particular, ¶34 alleged that
The joint criminal enterprise included gaining and exercising control over the
population of Sierra Leone in order to prevent or minimize resistance to their
geographic control, and to use members of the population to provide support to
the members of the joint criminal enterprise. The crimes alleged in this
Indictment, including unlawful killings, abductions, forced labour, physical and
sexual violence, use of child soldiers, looting and burning of civilian structures,
were either actions within the joint criminal enterprise or were a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise.74
The Prosecution argued that the defendants were liable under both the first and third categories
of JCE liability. The Trial Chamber held instead that the Indictment alleging a JCE was
“defectively pleaded” and ruled that it would not consider JCE as a mode of criminal
responsibility.75 The Trial Chamber said that the common purpose must be criminal and because
“any actions necessary” is not a crime under the SCSL statute, JCE was not properly alleged.76
The Court further held that although JCE can arise extemporaneously, because the time period
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Prosecutor v. Brima, et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated
Indictment, ¶33-34 (Feb. 18, 2005) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
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With the greatest respect, the Trial Chamber does not agree with the decision of our
learned colleagues that the Indictment has been properly pleaded with respect to liability
for JCE, since the common purpose alleged… is not a criminal purpose recognised [sic]
by the Statute. The common purpose pleaded in the Indictment does not contain a crime
under the Special Court’s jurisdiction. A common purpose “to take any actions necessary
to gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone” is not
an international crime.
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alleged in the Indictment covers all times relevant to the Indictment, the JCE must have been
criminal from its inception.77 The Trial Chamber ruled, however, when defendants formed the
agreement the common purpose was not criminal and therefore, there was no JCE.78 The Trial
Chamber then states that in looking at the evidence, the alleged common purpose must have
changed, but the Prosecution failed to provide material facts of this new or changed common
purpose. The SCSL held that “all those new and different purposes have to be pleaded in the
indictment and the Prosecution cannot be permitted to mould the case against the Accused as the
trial progresses.”79
The Trial Chamber found defendants guilty of the crimes related to the alleged JCE;
however defendants’ direct guilt was not difficult to prove since all the defendants actually
committed the atrocities alleged and were field commanders who personally carried out the
alleged acts.80 However, with the dismissal of the JCE charge, the Trial Chamber rejected much
of the prosecution’s case regarding crimes committed elsewhere in Sierra Leone.
The Trial Chamber also noted that prosecuting rebellion, acts of rebellion and challenges
to the authority of the State are charges purely for the State to decide and there “is no rule against
rebellion in international law.” Schabas, in claiming that he warned the Court of this ruling the
year before, maintained that the prosecution’s “suggestion seems rather close to a just war
theory, by which rebels are inherently part of a joint criminal enterprise whereas those who
77

Id. at ¶77. The Court held that the Indictment failed to contain the time period over which the JCE
existed. The prosecution, however, argued that the time frame applied should be all the times that are
relevant to the Indictment.
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defend entrenched authority are not.”81 He predicted that the JCE rejection will have
“potentially [] devastating consequences for the prosecution” and could be detrimental to future
cases, such as the case against Charles Taylor, who never stepped foot in Sierra Leone and did
not have his troops in Sierra Leone at the time of the commission of these alleged atrocities. 82
D. JCE Charges in Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa.
In February of 2004 the SCSL prosecution charged defendants Norman, Fofana and
Kondewa with counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.83 The indictment did not
allege a JCE explicitly, but instead alleged a common purpose or plan to use any means
necessary to defeat rival forces and gain and exercise control over the territory of Sierra Leone.
The prosecution’s indictment further alleged that this included the complete elimination of the
rival militia as well as their supporters and sympathizers.84 The indictment claimed that each
defendant is individually criminally responsible pursuant to Article 6.1 of the SCSL Statute “for
the crimes referred to in Articles 2, 3, 4 of the Statute . . . which crimes each of them planned,
instigated, ordered, committed . . . or which crimes were within a common purpose, plan or
design in which each Accused participated or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
common purpose, plan or design. . . .”85
The Trial Chamber rejected the JCE plea. It claimed that there was no evidence that the
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defendants, Fofana and Kondewa,86 ordered a common purpose, plan or design to commit
criminal acts. Further, the Trial Chamber said that there was no evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt proving that such a plan existed.87 It is extremely noteworthy to point out that the Trial
Chamber I, unlike Trial Chamber II in Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, did not mention
anything about the Indictment’s lack of sufficient pleading. Indeed Trial Chamber I rejected
defense claims that the Prosecution did not plead the indictment with sufficient specificity.88
The Trial Chamber I held that it does not need to examine whether a defendant knew precisely of
the crime committed, but rather whether he was aware that “a number of crimes would probably
be committed” by his subordinates, in furtherance of the common plan intended by the
defendant.89 Although the Trial Chamber I’s decisions do not affect Trial Chamber II decisions
and vice versa, the Trial Chamber I nevertheless did not find any defects in the indictment, which
was quite similar to the Brima Indictment.
IV. Analysis of the Brima Judgment.
The Trial Chamber’s dismissal of JCE in the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu is
not a ruling worthy of broad interpretation. The Indictment specifically alleged that the
defendants engaged in a JCE to “take any actions necessary” to effectuate control of Sierra
86
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Leone’s lucrative diamond mines. 90 The Indictment specifically alleged the crimes defendants
committed in order to further the JCE, or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint
criminal enterprise.91 The Trial Chamber found that this common purpose was not criminal in
nature nor a crime found in the Statute, both requirements of JCE liability.92 Schabas claimed
that the SCSL prosecution team disregarded the care that the prosecution team from the ICTY
took in alleging a JCE and that they “rather inexpertly alleged a joint criminal enterprise to
commit something which is not a crime.”93 For the reasons set forth below, this is unwarranted
criticism.
A. Criminal Means Create Illegitimate Ends.
At the ICTY, the courts found defendants criminally liable of a JCE when they engaged
in illegal means to further a common purpose. Illegal means fall under the crimes listed in the
appropriate statute as prosecutable. The most common example from the ICTY was the
participation in a common plan to create an all-Serbian State and the performance of illegal
measures, such as the commission of mass killings, in order to achieve this purpose. A purpose
may be non-criminal, but through criminal means, such as systematic rape, unlawful killings and
forced labor, the ICTY courts found a criminal enterprise. In the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara
and Kanu, the Trial Chamber found that the common purpose of taking any means necessary to
control diamond mines was not a crime within the Court’s Statute. The Court further held that

90

Prosecutor v. Brima, et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶33
(Feb. 18, 2005) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].

91

Id. at ¶34.

92

Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶67 (June 20, 2007)
[relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
93

Schabas online article, supra note 55 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51].

22

“the contribution to a joint criminal enterprise need not be criminal in nature,” but the purpose
must be inherently criminal.94 In other words, the Trial Chamber held that there is a JCE only if
the common purpose is itself a crime within the Statute. This concept is in opposition to ICTY
jurisprudence. The common purpose need not be criminal. Often, defendants committed crimes
in an attempt to effectuate a legitimate common purpose and the ICTY found individual criminal
liability based on a theory of JCE. As the Appeals Chamber held in Prosecutor v. Kvocka, a
“joint criminal enterprise is simply a means of committing a crime; it is not a crime in itself.”95
1. The Criminal Means Interweave with the Common Purpose.
The Indictment in the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu alleged that defendants
committed crimes as a part of the JCE. The alleged crimes are punishable according to the
SCSL’s statute and are within the SCSL’s jurisdiction. 96 ICTY cases held that JCE participation
consists of crimes that are direct and significant.97 Sometimes defendants engage in a
particularized criminal purpose; one subset for the purposes of forced labor, while another for
systemic rape. The end result is one large final purpose made up of several criminal acts. 98 This
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large-scale systematic scheme incurs individual criminal liability.99 In the Prosecutor v. Kvocka
the Appeals Chamber drew from Nuremberg jurisprudence and held that within a JCE there may
be other subsidiary criminal enterprises.100 These smaller crimes may arise extemporaneously
and without prior planning or thought, in order to effectuate a larger common purpose. In
Prosecutor v. Brima the defendants took any means necessary, including committing crimes, to
effectuate their common purpose and control the diamond mines. This larger plan could not
have occurred without these crimes and they became inseparable from the common purpose. 101
Defendants took whatever actions they could to control these mines. These extemporaneous
smaller crimes combined and performed in order to further the larger purpose became so
interwoven it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate them. While it is possible to distinguish
each crime as a separate JCE, it is unnecessary since the crimes wove themselves into the larger
common purpose. The Indictment clearly alleged the crimes taken were to further or were
foreseeable to the common purpose. Although it is possible that these crimes arose
extemporaneously, they were all part of the common design.
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2. Use Conspiracy Doctrine to Find Criminal Liability for the JCE.
JCE and conspiracy doctrines both share similar characteristics for finding responsibility
and individual criminal liability. Both methods require two or more people to form an
agreement to openly commit an illegal act in order to further a common plan or conspiracy. 102
In conspiracy law, whose doctrine comes primarily from common law countries, 103 that act does
not have be unlawful nor need to be the substantive offense that the indictment charges.104
Parties possess knowledge of the conspiracy and at least one conspirator committed an act
openly to further the conspiracy. JCE appears to be a hybrid that resembles both accomplice and
conspiratorial liability. JCE requires actual commission of a crime or crimes105 and merges two
theories of liability, capturing “such crucial organisational [sic] actors as serious offenders, and
lifts their veil of legitimacy by establishing an overarching criminal motivation and
dedication.”106 The extended or third form of JCE is most similar to limited conspiracy.107
However, unlike conspiracy, JCE standing alone is not a crime. It is only a complicity
doctrine.108 The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić addressed the relationship between conspiracy
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and JCE and found that JCE requires a meeting of the minds and an action to further the common
plan.109 Conspiracy liability requires only making an agreement to commit an offense, while
JCE liability requires not only making the agreement but also actually carrying out an act to
further the common purpose.110 JCE is therefore a slight limitation of accountability vis-à-vis
conspiracy.111 JCE liability also requires establishing that there is a “common purpose which
amounts to or involves the commission of a crime.”112 This implies that when criminal means
are taken to further a common purpose, there is JCE liability.
Since JCE and conspiracy law have similar requirements for finding criminal liability, it
is possible to use conspiracy law in assigning liability for JCE.113 In conspiracy law the act
committed does not have to be unlawful nor need to be the substantive offense that the
indictment charges.114 A conspiracy exists when two or more people get together to do an
unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means.115 Analogously, even if the common purpose is
not criminal, if defendants commit criminal acts to effectuate the larger purpose, there is JCE
liability. The entire common purpose, in effect, becomes inherently criminal, especially because
defendants took illegitimate means to further the common purpose.
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Conspiracy law is an ancient doctrine found in English common law. Lord Denman
made the classic statement that came to embody the definition of conspiracy in Rex v. Jones.116
He said that a conspiracy indictment must “charge a conspiracy either to do an unlawful act or a
lawful act by unlawful means.”117 In Rex v. Seward, there was a conspiracy to procure a
marriage between a “male pauper and female pauper” for the purpose of “throwing the woman’s
maintenance upon the husband’s parish.”118 The Court of the King’s Bench held that this was
not indictable because “the purpose of the transaction . . . was not illegal, provided no unlawful
means were used.”119 Justice Littledale said “[i]f parties conspire to do an unlawful act, or a
lawful act by unlawful means, this is a conspiracy, for which they may be indicted.”120 The
United States also employed the same definition of conspiracy to its laws. An example is the
1844 case State v. Burnham, where the Superior Court of the Judicature of New Hampshire held
that “a conspiracy is a confederacy to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means,
whether to the prejudice of an individual or of the public, and it is not necessary that its object
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should be the commission of a crime.”121 In another U.S. case, Pettibone v. U.S., the Supreme
Court defined conspiracy as “a combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to
accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful,
by criminal or unlawful means, and the rule is accepted . . . .”122 More recently, the United
Kingdom’s Criminal Law Act of 1977, still in action today, defines a conspiracy as when “a
person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which,
if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions . . . amounts to or involves the
commission of any offence or offences by one or more of the parties to the agreement” (emphasis
added).123 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court defined a conspiracy as, “two or more
persons to effect an illegal object as an end or means, and joint purpose or intent need not be to
commit a crime, or even unlawful act, if it is intended to accomplish the act by surreptitious or
unlawful means. . . .”124 Congress codified this definition and found criminal liability when “two
or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States . . . and one or
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy . . .” (emphasis added).125
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The High Court of Australia also holds that conspiracy is an “agreement of two or more to do an
unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.”126 In Queen v. Churchill and Walton,
Viscount Dilhorne said that “mens rea is only an essential ingredient in conspiracy in so far as
there must be an intention to be a party to an agreement to do an unlawful act.”127 In the recent
case Lipohar v. The Queen the High Court of Australia further held that, “[p]arties can join, or
leave, a conspiracy after it has been formed, and acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy will
constitute continuing performance, as well as evidence, of the unlawful agreement.” Further, the
Court held that with respect to the position held in England defining a conspiracy, when
defendants form an agreement to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, this suffices to support
a charge of a conspiracy under Australian common law. The Court held that it was clear from
the facts in Lipohar that Defendants took criminal steps in furtherance of the agreement between
themselves and that is sufficient to support a charge of conspiracy.128 Therefore, if defendants
employ illegitimate means, even in an effort toward a legitimate end, common law courts
consider it a conspiracy.
Conspiracy liability is foreign to civil law countries, but has become a norm in
international criminal liability, especially in regard to genocide.129 The most obvious example is
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the treatment of conspiracy at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg Court to a dramatic step outside of
the common law approach and the prosecution tried to use conspiracy as a means to criminalize
an entire organization.130 In the Indictment in the United States, et al. v. Goering, et al., the
Prosecution alleged that defendants
participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the
commission of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity
…are individually responsible for their own acts and for all acts committed by
any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy…. In the development
and course of the common plan or conspiracy it came to embrace the commission
of War Crimes…. The common plan or conspiracy contemplated and came to
embrace as typical and systematic means, and the defendants determined upon
and committed, Crimes against Humanity, both within Germany and within
occupied territories, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
and other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations before and during
the war, and persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, in execution of
the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many of such
acts and persecutions being violations of the domestic laws of the countries where
perpetrated.131
This attempt at assigning conspiracy liability worked partly: the judges ruled that an
organization’s members were liable on their individual accountability for a certain criminal act.
Yet, the Tribunal saw the correlation between group criminality and conspiracy.132 The
conspiracy doctrine made a heavy impact in Nuremberg and became enshrined as part of
international criminal law.133
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Therefore, because conspiracy law and JCE are similar to each other and both rely on the
furtherance of a common plan, the same means-based test used in conspiracy law is useable in
finding JCE liability. There is a move by the tribunals toward this direction. For example, in
Prosecutor v. Kvocka, the Appeals Chamber held that an individual does not need to know of
each crime committed to further the JCE to be criminally liable. Knowing that crimes are being
committed within a system is enough.134
3. Motive Behind the Common Purpose is Irrelevant.
The suspect’s motive or ultimate aim behind the common purpose is inconsequential in
determining criminal liability. In the Prosecutor v. Brdanin the Trial Chamber held that
although the common purpose must amount to or involve an understanding or agreement
between two or more people that they will commit a crime within the corresponding Statute, “the
underlying purpose for entering into such an agreement (i.e., the ultimate aim pursued by the
commission of the crimes) is irrelevant for the purposes of establishing individual criminal
responsibility pursuant to the theory of JCE.”135 Similarly, the court in the Prosecutor v. Kvocka
held that an accused’s motive is immaterial when assessing his intent and criminal
responsibility.136 “The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime [] may be, for example, to
obtain personal economic benefits, or political advantage or some sort of power. The existence
of a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator from also having the specific intent to
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commit [a crime]” (emphasis added).137 Furthermore, Krnojelac held that “shared criminal
intent does not require the co-perpetrator’s personal satisfaction or enthusiasm or his personal
initiative in contributing to the joint enterprise.”138 It is clear that ICTY jurisprudence does not
evaluate motive in assessing JCE liability. Yet, the SCSL held otherwise.
In Brima the prosecution alleged in their Indictment that the defendants formed a
common plan and acted upon that plan (which included committing crimes listed in the SCSL
statute) to effectuate control of diamond mines. However, the Trial Chamber held that
international law does not prosecute for acts of rebellion against the State. The Trial Chamber
therefore ignores the Brdanin, Kvocka and Krnojelac decisions which all held that the aim
behind the common plan is irrelevant for establishing JCE individual criminal liability. 139
Instead, the Trial Chamber develops its own rule, which effectively negates the ICTY decisions
which served as precedent on which the Prosecutor relied.
The SCSL therefore misses the concept behind the common purpose doctrine. JCE finds
criminal responsibility not based on personal commission, but on a suspect’s criminal
participation in a common plan.140 The motive behind the common purpose in Brima, rebellion
against the State, is irrelevant in determining JCE liability. From their intent to commit crimes
defendants are criminally liable for a JCE to gain political power in Sierra Leone.
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B. The Trial Chamber Erred in Ruling that a JCE Cannot Change Over Time.
The Trial Chamber held that the JCE alleged in the Indictment must be criminal from its
inception. It argued that if the common plan to control Sierra Leone’s diamond mines involved
crimes, the plan started at the beginning of this agreement. However, because many of these
crimes were extemporaneous or there was no agreement to commit these crimes originally, the
Trial Chamber believed the JCE changed. The Trial Chamber claimed that the Prosecution was
required to demonstrate this in their Indictment, but failed to do so and was another reason why
the Court dismissed the JCE charge. This holding runs contrary to ICTY precedent which holds
that a JCE may contain initially lawful agreements that transform over time to involve crimes.141
The Prosecution argued that the time period of the JCE is relevant to all times listed in
the Indictment. Yet, the Trial Chamber made an unfounded evidentiary argument and claimed
that the Prosecution must plead the new and different purposes in the Indictment. The Court
held that although there is no dispute that a new JCE may arise from a different common
purpose, “it is more important for the Prosecution to provide material facts of this new or
changed common purpose in the Indictment.”142 The Court quoted Prosecutor v. Blagojević
which says that if the objective of the JCE changes, “such that the objective is fundamentally
different in nature and scope from the common plan or design to which the participants
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originally agreed, then a new and distinct joint criminal enterprise has been established.”143
However, the overall purpose, control of the diamond mines, did not change. As ICTY
jurisprudence holds, crimes may arise extemporaneously to further the common purpose. In
addition, each crime committed was to further the common purpose and intertwined with the
common purpose to become indistinguishable. Further, the Blagojević decision says nothing
about the requirement to provide new proof, but only says that “for this joint criminal enterprise,
like the original joint criminal enterprise, the three elements must be established for criminal
responsibility to attach.”144 The Trial Chamber presented this problem as a defective pleading.
However, it appears to be more of an evidentiary issue, and further, creates an unprecedented
strict requirement for what the Prosecutor must prove.145 Finally, this reasoning is illogical. The
Court holds that a JCE must be criminal. However, if the JCE changed, as the Trial Chamber
believes, it changed from being non-criminal to criminal. Yet, the Trial Chamber claimed there
can be no JCE if it is not criminal. Therefore, the Trial Chamber holds two diverging opinions: a
JCE must be a crime and a JCE does not have to be a crime. 146
C. The Specificity Required by the SCSL Runs Contrary To ICTY Jurisprudence.
The SCSL requires a certain specificity in the Indictment that is at odds with prior ICTY
JCE cases. The courts usually permitted general allegations of JCE, as long as the indictments
put the Defendant on notice of his or her crimes. In the Indictment in Brima, the prosecution did
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this by clearly listing the crimes alleged in the Indictment.147 In contrast, in other indictments
from the ICTY, the Court found JCE inferred from the nature of the crimes. Paragraph 34 of the
Indictment also lists the alleged crimes defendants committed in order to either further the JCE,
or were foreseeable consequences arising from pursuit of the JCE. The ICTY therefore created a
type of precedent of how to argue for JCE, of which the Indictment adhered.
1. ICTY Cases Inferred JCE from the Nature of Charges Alleged.
The specificity the SCSL requires is in opposition to the jurisprudence found in similar
cases at the ICTY.148 The ICTY Trial and Appeals Chambers not only set a precedent for
allowing general allegations of JCE, but found a JCE existed when it was not alleged in the
indictment. Tadić held that the nature of the crimes alleged in the Indictment gave rise to the
inference of a JCE, since a plurality of persons acted in unison to effectuate a JCE.149 Therefore,
it is not necessary that the Indictment specifically alleges a JCE.
First, in Prosecutor v. Krstic, the prosecution failed to plead JCE in the indictment. Yet,
the Trial Chamber found JCE inferred by the nature of the crimes committed and charged.150
The Trial Chamber also found that the indictment sufficiently pled facts to find Krstic
responsible for taking part in the alleged crimes in concert with others and that he was
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responsible in carrying out these crimes.151 The Trial Chamber said that it “is of the view that
the issue of General Krstic's criminal responsibility for the[se] crimes…is most appropriately
determined under Article 7(1) by considering whether he participated…in a joint criminal
enterprise to forcibly ‘cleanse’ the Srebrenica enclave of its Muslim population and to ensure
that they left the territory otherwise occupied by Serbian forces.”152 Therefore, the nature of
crimes alone is enough for a JCE inference.
There are, however, cases where the court found the prosecution’s indictment too vague
and dismissed the JCE charge. In Prosecutor v. Krnojelac the indictment never directly alleged
that the accused acted pursuant to a JCE to persecute non-Serbs, but the Court inferred as much
from the nature of the crimes the indictment alleged.153 The indictment accused defendants of
acting pursuant to a common plan carrying out crimes such as torture, enslavement, cruel
treatment and inhumane acts.154 Yet the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s decision
and said that the indictment, which never alleged a JCE, was too vague to find the third form of
JCE liability and found defendants guilty of the first kind of JCE liability only.155 It also held
that “a failure to specify in the indictment which form or forms of liability the Prosecution is
pleading gives rise to ambiguity….[S]uch ambiguity should be avoided and…the Prosecution
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must identify precisely the form or forms of liability alleged for each count….”156 The Appeals
Chamber required that the indictment inform the accused of the nature and the cause of the
charge against him. The Indictment in the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu on the other
hand clearly laid out the charges alleged against defendants and furthermore, specifically alleged
that defendants committed these crimes in furtherance of the common purpose, or the crimes
were a foreseeable cause of furthering the common purpose.157 It was clear Defendants’ crimes
fell under the first and third types of JCE liability. In light of Prosecutor v. Krnojelac,
Defendants were sufficiently on notice of their charges.
In Prosecutor v. Kvocka, decided a few years after Krnojelac and Krstic, the prosecution
introduced the theory of JCE in its pre-trial brief, but neglected to do so in their indictment.158
The defense claimed that the prosecutor did not therefore properly plead JCE and the Court
should limit the indictment. Both the Appeals and Trial Chambers disagreed and held that
explicit pleading of JCE is not necessary to have in an indictment to find a JCE.159 While the
Kvocka Trial Chamber admits that they desire greater specificity in drafting indictments, failure
to identify expressly the exact mode of participation is not necessarily fatal to an indictment if
the indictment nevertheless makes clear to the accused the nature of the charge against him. The
SCSL Trial Chamber judgment cited Kvocka, but used it improperly and out of context.160 The
156

Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶138 (Sept. 17, 2003) [relevant
pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

157

Prosecutor v. Brima, et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶34
(Feb. 18, 2005) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].

158

Powles, supra note 1, at 618 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48].

159

Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Judgment, ¶247 (Nov. 2, 2001) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

160

Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶28 (Feb. 28, 2005) [relevant pages
reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13]; Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, Kanu, Case No. SCSL-

37

Kvocka Appeals Judgment is more concerned with the Defendant’s awareness of the charges
against him. The Appeals Chamber required that “if the Prosecution relies on a theory of joint
criminal enterprise, then the Prosecutor must plead the purpose of the enterprise, the identity of
the participants, and the nature of the accused's participation in the enterprise.”161 The Appeals
Chamber said, in order for the Defendant to truly understand the charges against him, the
indictment should indicate the form of JCE alleged.162 In the Brima Indictment the Prosecution
explicitly defined the crimes used to accomplish the joint purpose as well as what forms of JCE
liability the prosecution alleges.163 The Prosecution still aptly described the “any actions
necessary” in their Indictment and furthermore, ICTY jurisprudence does not require extensive
explicitly or specificity in their Indictments.164
In Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana the ICTR reaffirmed that the standard for whether a JCE
is pled “with sufficient particularity is dependent upon whether it sets out the material facts of
the Prosecution case with enough detail to inform a defendant clearly of the charges against him
or her so that he or she may prepare his or her defence [sic].”165 In Ntakirutimana the ICTR
found that the Indictments did not put the defendants on notice of JCE. The Appeals Chamber
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wrote “the mere reference by the Prosecution to the joint criminal enterprise illustrating the
‘dolus eventualis’ doctrine in its Pre-Trial and Closing Briefs cannot be understood as an
unambiguous pleading of participation in the first form of joint criminal enterprise which is the
form the Prosecution advances on this appeal.”166 Furthermore, unlike the Indictment in Brima,
there was no reference to JCE in the Indictment.167 The Brima Indictment specifically alleged
the JCE and the crimes defendants allegedly committed in order to further the JCE or which were
a foreseeable consequence of the JCE. The Indictment put defendants on notice of their charges
and gave them sufficient information to refute those charges as well. The Indictment is not
analogous to other ICTY or ICTR Indictments which courts held as vague or too general.
2. Courts Allowed Vague or General Allegations of JCE in the Past.
The Trial Chamber held that paragraphs 33 and 34 of the Indictment did not provide
defendants’ adequate notice of the criminal purpose defendants allegedly entered into at the
inception of their agreement.168 Further, the SCSL held that engagement in an armed conflict is
not an international crime.169 While this may be true, the Trial Chamber ignores the larger issue.
The Indictment clearly alleges, in paragraph 34, that Defendants took action to commit crimes
within the statute in order to effectuate control of diamond mines. Furthermore, while it is true
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that mere membership in a group is not enough to find liability, the focus is on participation.170
The ICTY held that participation may take place in a variety of forms and may be quite broad.171
Defendants’ participation in this case is easy to find since each was a member of a military force
and the Trial Chamber found defendants guilty of the commission of these crimes.
In examining ICTY jurisprudence, prior to July 2004, the ICTY generally ruled that a
court could convict a defendant on a theory of JCE liability even if his indictment did not
explicitly refer to a JCE. In fact, phrases like “in concert” were enough to implicitly infer a
JCE.172 The Brima Indictment goes a step further and, while adhering to ICTY jurisprudence,
specifically accuses individuals of participating in a JCE.173 The SCSL followed the precedent
set by the tribunals and the language in the indictment demonstrates that the prosecutor embraces
the most expansive application of JCE liability developed by the ICTY.”174
After 2004, the Prosecutor v. Brdanin slightly altered how to allege a JCE. The Trial
Chamber ruled that Brdanin was not a participant in the JCE or common plan, and dismissed the
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charge.175 Further, the Trial Chamber said the indictment required greater specificity in accusing
those involved in the JCE. The indictment alleged a JCE between “the army of the Republika
Srpska, Serb paramilitary forces and others.” The Trial Chamber held the indictment must
specifically identify groups involved in the JCE and using “others” was insufficient.176 Even
with this slight limitation on pleading a JCE, the Prosecutor v. Brima et al. stayed within the
contours of this case. The Indictment clearly alleged the JCE, those involved in the JCE and
what crimes took place as a result of the JCE.
In the Prosecutor v. Tadić, the prosecution never specifically alleged in the indictment
Tadić’s culpability for murder pursuant to a theory of JCE. After the development of JCE,
prosecutors continue to make allegations that are barely specific enough to make a defendant
truly aware of all the charges against him. The ICTY Courts allow this practice. The ICTY
arguably used JCE as a “catch all” as it was the best standard to prosecute defendants.177 In
effect, ICTY jurisprudence demonstrated that there are no well-defined limits on the scope of
JCE that a prosecutor may charge.178 For example, when charging genocide, it is irrelevant,
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under the third form of JCE, to have the mens rea to actually commit genocide.179 There is an
“enormous elasticity” of the JCE doctrine and in the manner the Courts at the ICTY used it.180
The ICTR also adheres to the precedent set by the ICTY. In Prosecutor v. Simba the
Court denied defendant’s claim of insufficient notice of JCE. 181 The Trial Chamber held that the
Indictment was sufficiently clear, but admitted that the Prosecution could have pleaded the JCE
in a more clear and organized manner in the Indictment. However, the Indictment referred to the
JCE under all four counts in connection with responsibility under the ICTR Statute.182 The ICTR
Trial Chamber allowed the allegation of JCE to stand. Similar to Simba, the Indictment in Brima
put defendants on sufficient notice of their JCE charge and which forms of liability the
Indictment alleged.
3. The Common Purpose Alleged Does Not Have to be in the Statute.
Since the ICTY courts, not the prosecution, found a JCE in Tadić, Kvocka and Krstic, the
ICTY courts created a precedent allowing indirect allegations of a JCE in indictments. Further,
the Court considered ambiguous terms, such as “forced removal,” a crime within a JCE, although
it is not a crime in the statute. 183 For example, in Prosecutor v. Brdanin, the indictment claimed
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that Brdanin knowingly and willfully participated in a JCE and bore individual criminal
liability.184 The indictment alleged Brdanin’s involvement in a common purpose to ensure the
cooperation between political authorities and the army in order to create a separate Bosnian Serb
State “through the forcible removal of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat inhabitants from the
territory of the planned Serbian state by the commission of the crimes alleged in Counts 1
through 12.”185 The Trial Chamber found that those in charge of the removal used fear and force
as a tactic.186
The Trial Chamber dismissed the JCE allegation because of Brdanin’s lack of
involvement in the JCE. The Trial Chamber also dismissed the JCE allegation for the lack of
express agreement between the principal perpetrators and the defendant.187 The Court did not
dismiss the JCE for lack of specificity or for vagueness as an improper pleading. The Court
never touched on whether the allegation of JCE was unclear or too general, nor did the Trial
Chamber claim that the common purpose was not a crime within the ICTY Statute.
In Prosecutor v. Stakic, the indictment charged Stakic with participating in a JCE. The
indictment, similar to Brdanin, claimed that “the purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was the
permanent forcible removal of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat inhabitants…including a
campaign of persecutions through the commission of the crimes alleged in Counts 1 to 8 of the
purview of “other inhumane acts.” Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment (Mar.
22, 2006) [relevant pages reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
184
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Indictment.”188 The Appeals Chamber found Stakic guilty of both the first and third category of
a JCE through the prosecutor’s allegations.189
In both Brdanin and Stakic their Indictments alleged that defendants committed crimes
though the common plan of permanent forcible removal. The Brima Indictment alleged JCE
similarly, with a slight variation in wording.190 The Indictment read
the joint criminal enterprise included gaining and exercising control over the
population of Sierra Leone in order to prevent or minimize resistance to their
geographic control, and to use members of the population to provide support to
the members of the joint criminal enterprise. The crimes alleged in this
Indictment, including unlawful killings, abductions, forced labour, physical and
sexual violence, use of child soldiers, looting and burning of civilian structures
were either actions within the joint criminal enterprise or were a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise.191
This indictment is similar to other ICTY indictments, where the JCE was the permanent removal
of Bosnian Muslims committed by crimes prosecutable under the respective statute. By refusing
to consider JCE as a form of individual criminal liability, the SCSL is blatantly ignoring ICTY
jurisprudence which holds that a JCE is committed through crimes provided for in the Statute
and inferring criminal liability from the crimes alleged, even if the common purpose is not listed
as a crime within the appropriate Statute.
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VII. Public Policy Criticism of the Decision.
Although the JCE doctrine has a broad scope, the policy rationale is just, since often
those convicted for the commission of war crimes are merely following orders. Without JCE
liability, the people convicted of committing heinous acts would consist only of low-ranking
officials and soldiers while those who planned and instigated the acts would face little or no
punishment. JCE therefore puts the responsibility of the crime upon the shoulders of the person
who organized the commission of the crime itself, rendering accountability where it is due. It is
difficult at times to find evidence that proves that defendants committed particular crimes. JCE
liability helps prosecutors convict those who are responsible when proof may not exist and has a
broad interpretive element in order to protect the most fundamental rights.192
The idea behind JCE as individual criminal liability is consistent with the purpose behind
the ICTY’s creation itself: to hold leaders accountable for war crimes and deter leaders from
committing war crimes in the future.193 Looking at the history of JCE, it borrows some of
human rights law’s most important and expansive methodologies.194 For example, human rights
courts often used the “object and purpose” of treaties to “support an expansive” view of rights.195
Professor R. Bernhardt, a former President of the European Court of Human Rights, noted that
192
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“the object and purpose of human rights treaties may often lead to a broader interpretation of
individual rights. . . .”196 Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights read “implied rights” into
the European Convention on Human Rights in order to represent what the Court saw as the
Convention’s object and purpose regarding the protection of an individual’s right.197
Due to this broad interpretation of individual rights, ICTY jurisprudence and international
human rights law often use wide-ranging methodologies to hold those accountable of committing
the most heinous crimes. Yet, the Trial Chamber refused to do so in Prosecutor v. Brima,
Kamara and Kanu. The Trial Chamber ruled the Indictment was too vague in its allegation of
JCE, and not properly pled.198 The Trial Chamber said that this was fixable if the prosecution
provided a timely, clear and consistent pre-trial brief, but that the Prosecution failed to provide
the Defense with a clear brief properly alleging the JCE.199 It appears that this Court is
punishing the prosecution for a semantic issue; an issue not in line with ICTY jurisprudence.
The nature of the crimes gave rise to an inference of JCE. The Indictment was not any more
general or vague than other ICTY indictments, and furthermore, followed the prior precedent on
how to plead a JCE sufficiently. The Indictment listed the crimes committed that were part of
the JCE, which as the ICTY jurisprudence holds, does not have to be a crime in it of itself.
196
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The next question is whether the judgment in the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu
is an issue of word choice and the Trial Chamber’s way of reigning in the expansive use of JCE,
contrary to ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence. The Court did not say whether the answer is simply
to claim that Defendants shared a common plan to commit crimes listed in the statute to gain
control of diamond mines. Instead, the Trial Chamber dismissed the entire charge. Simply put,
the dismissal of the JCE charge is nothing more than an admonishment of the prosecution’s error
and defies the standards of justice and accountability war crimes tribunals are to provide to
protect individuals’ implied rights.
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VII. Conclusion
The SCSL Trial Chamber’s decision in the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu at
first sent a message of doom for international criminal prosecutors and appeared to limit JCE
liability. However, this decision has a narrow interpretation. First, it disregards tribunals’
jurisprudence, particularly, that a JCE itself does not have to be criminal in nature. Instead, a
JCE consists of a formed agreement among a plurality of persons to commit crimes or who
intend to commit crimes. Since defendants, in Prosecutor v. Brima, formed an agreement to
commit crimes in order to further a common plan, there was a JCE.
Second, the Trial Chamber engaged in faulty reasoning when it claimed that the
Indictment must show how the JCE changed into one that involves the commission of crimes.
The Trial Chamber seems to say that the first JCE was not criminal. This is in opposition to its
original, albeit incorrect rule that a JCE must be criminal. This theory also does not flow
logically and runs contrary to ICTY precedent which says that agreements may transform over
time to then involve crimes and arise extemporaneously while part of the same JCE. The Trial
Chamber also created a new, strict requirement not found in ICTY jurisprudence.
Third, the Indictment in Prosecutor v. Brima alleged that defendants clearly alleged the
crimes defendants took to further their common purpose. The “any means necessary” clearly
delineated prosecutable crimes listed in the SCSL statute. It is also common for courts to infer
criminal liability from the nature of the crimes alleged. Finally, the Trial Chamber’s decision in
Brima is in conflict with prior ICTY precedent and is against public policy arguments. This
memorandum maintains that the Trial Chamber erred in dismissing the JCE charge and this
Brima is not the proper guide for defining notice and what contributes to a finding of JCE
liability theory.
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